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Introduction
What happens when we feel severe pain, whether because of an injury or a surgery, or
something completely different? We go to the doctor, and she might prescribe a painkiller. These
painkillers often come in the form of opioids. Unfortunately, this “quick fix” can result in abuse
or dependence by patients, but doctors still are expected to prescribe them to patients when they
are in pain. Opioid abuse has developed into in a clear public health epidemic across the United
States.1 Doctors may very well be to blame for an overabundance of prescription medications by
enabling accessible to Americans who may not need them, especially considering the less
addictive alternatives.2
Ideas about pain management shifted toward more frequent prescriptions of opioids as
recent as the 1980s and started what was to become steadily increasing numbers of drug
overdoses.3 Opioids were considered underutilized in the 1980s, and pain management advocates
began to promote the increased usage of these drugs. 4 Opioid use disorder (“OUD”), which
exhibits signs of opioid dependence and bodily tolerance but is a distinct phenomenon, became
more prevalent among users as prescription numbers increased.5 OUD is described as a
“problematic pattern of behavior characterized by intense ‘cravings’ that contribute to
‘compulsive drug seeking and use, despite harmful consequences’.” 6

1

See, e.g., Sara E. Heins, Prescription Opioids: A Continuing Contributor to the Epidemic, 109 AM. J. PUB. H EALTH
1166, 1167 (Sept. 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6687263/pdf/AJPH.2019.305253.pdf.
2 Id.
3 The Prescription Opioid Epidemic: An Evidence-Based Approach, JOHNS H OPKINS B LOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB.
H EALTH 21 (2015), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-drug-safety-andeffectiveness/research/prescription-opioids/JHSPH_OPIOID_EPIDEMIC_REPORT.pdf .
4 Id.
5 Jennifer Lyden & Ingrid A. Binswanger, The United States Opioid Epidemic, SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 3 (Apr.
2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6578581/pdf/nihms-1017300.pdf.
6 Id.
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Improving prescribing practices for physicians can have several positive effects that
manifest less of a risk for opioid abuse.7 The Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) has released
recommendations for clinicians with prescription pharmaceutical opioids to treat pain:
When to initiate or continue opioids:
1. on-pharmacologic therapy and non-opioid pharmacologic therapy are
preferred treatment for chronic pain. If used, opioids should be given in
combination with non-pharmacologic therapy and non-opioid pharmacologic
therapy when appropriate.
2. Realistic treatment goals should be established prior to initiating therapy.
3. Before starting and periodically during treatment, clinicians should discuss
risks and benefits with the patient.
Opioid selection, dosing and duration:
1. Immediate release opioids should be used instead of long acting opioids.
2. The lowest effective dose should be prescribed.
3. When treating acute pain, the lowest effective dose of immediate release
opioids should be used for a limited duration; typically 3 days or less, rarely
more than 7 days.
4. Clinicians should reevaluate benefits and harms with the patient 1-4 weeks
after starting chronic opioid therapy and re-assess risk-benefit of medication.
Assessing risk and addressing harms:
1. Evaluate risk factors for adverse events before initiation and during
treatment. Consider naloxone for higher risk patients.
2. Review prescription drug monitor program (PDMP) database before
initiating and during treatment.
3. Urine drug testing should be used before initiating and periodically during
treatment.
4. Avoid prescribing opioids and benzodiazepines together.
5. Offer treatment or refer patients to treatment if opioid use disorders is
expected.8
However, physicians may not pay nearly enough attention to a patient’s personal risk
factors—such as family history of addiction—when prescribing prescriptions despite the
presumption that all of those who are prescribed opioids are at some risk.9

7

See, e.g., A. Thomas McLellan & Barbara J. Turner, Chronic Noncancer Pain Management and Opioid Overdose:
Time to Change Prescribing Practices, ANNALS OF I NTERNAL M ED. (Jan. 19, 2010),
https://www.acpjournals.org/doi/full/10.7326/0003-4819-152-2-201001190-00012.
8 CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, C TR. FOR DISEASE C ONTROL ,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/Guidelines_At-A-Glance-508.pdf (last visited May 5, 2022).
9 Steven D. Passik, Issues in Long-term Opioid Therapy: Unmet Needs, Risks, and Solutions, M AYO C LINIC PROC.
593, 596 (July 1, 2009), https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0025 6196%2811%2960748-9.
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The federal and state governments have a system in place that does regulate the processes
by which opioids can be distributed, but what should be the limit on these regulations? The
Supreme Court of the United States is currently faced with an issue that intertwines two very
important public policy interests: opioid prescription practices in light of the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), and regulations on physicians’ scope of practice.10 However, this case
looks mostly at the defense of “good faith” for the doctor to have prescribed the prescription
drug for a “legitimate medical purpose.”11 Regardless of the outcome of this case, the balance
between regulation of prescribing physicians and allowing prescriptions for historically addictive
drugs will likely keep the status quo for pain management techniques.
The CSA makes it illegal for “any person knowingly or intentionally … to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense” a controlled substance “except as authorized by this subchapter.” 12 The
Ruan case balances two larger public policy interests between prosecuting “drug pusher”
physicians and allowing doctors to have the freedom to practice medicine following long and
formal medical education. The petitioner is a physician whose appeal comes specifically
regarding a “good faith” defense which was not offered to him at trial.
This paper examines the issues surrounding the Ruan case to weigh public policy matters,
potential defrauding of government funds, and the overall issue of opioid dependency. Part I
gives an overview of the relevant federal statutes that pertain to opioid -related prosecutions by
distributors. Part I.A discusses specifically the elements of the CSA and its enforcement. Part I.B
looks to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and how it further regulates drugs on the open
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See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Ruan v. United States, (No. 20-1410), 2021 WL 6138172 (2021). These are not the
issue on appeal. However, for the purposes of this paper, I consider the Ruan case considering the public policy
concerns that surround the statutes in question.
11 Id.
12 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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market. Part I.C discusses the False Claims Act as a prosecutorial strategy that supplements the
previous two statutes.
Part II analyzes similar measures taken by state governments. Part II.A discusses states’
board regulations and how they play a role in mitigating opioid abuse. Part II.B assesses the
legislative side of New Jersey’s substance control regulations and how they are prosecuted on the
state level.
Part III analyzes the elements of the appeal to the Supreme Court in Ruan. Part III.A
discusses the “legitimate medical purpose” requirement. Part III.B discusses the “good faith
standard and weighs the arguments for a subjective standard and for an objective standard.
Part IV discusses the argument that the public policy concerns will not be remedied by
the Ruan decision. Part III provides the conclusion that despite simultaneous efforts to crack
down on blatant abuse through “drug pushers” and to ensure patients receive the best possible
care, the presence of opioids as a treatment for ailments will always incur serious risks for
potential abuse by its users. The paper concludes by arguing for alternatives to opioids to prevent
further damage to Americans.

I. Regulating Opioids Through Federal Statutes
The government has an interest in preventing fraud and abuse in the healthcare field
under several statutes. Fraud in the medical field can have serious—and sometimes deadly—
consequences.13 Legislation like the CSA, False Claims Act (FCA), and Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), in part, provide a system by which healthcare fraud and abuse can be
regulated and resolved. Considering the focus of this paper, the CSA directly combats a broader
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See, e.g., Laura A. Feldman, Determining the Proper Standard of Causation to Support a Conviction under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1347 When Healthcare Fraud Results in Death , 98 I OWA L. REV. 2061, 2064 (2013).
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issue with over prescription of drugs and the concurrent issue of opioid abuse. 14 The FDCA
provides protection to the consuming public for food, drug, and cosmetic goods. 15 The FCA
provides further monetary penalties for violators of other federal laws when government
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, are responsible for paying for these drugs.16
Additionally, states may set their own regulations for substances through state boards and
enforce those regulations through state boards and prosecutors, but federal law does not wholly
preempt the state law in a federal action.17
President Nixon’s “War on Drugs” sparked a big shift toward heavily prosecuting drug
use in response to growing concerns about American culture.18 President Nixon created the Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) as part of this initiative to assist other State Departments in antidrug enforcement.19 In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act, which similarly overhauled the federal regulation of drugs. 20 Following President
Nixon’s tightening of policies, President Carter successfully worked with the Senate to legalize
up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use.21 Later, the number of incarcerated persons
convicted of nonviolent drug law offenses began to increase under President Reagan’s
administration, rising from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997.22 Although the Clinton
administration advocated for treatment rather than incarceration, drug regulation and prosecution

See The Controlled Substances Act, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-information/csa (last
visited May 5, 2022).
15 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/laws-enforced-fda/federal-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act-fdc-act (last
visited May 5, 2022).
16 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
17 See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. H EALTH C ARE L. & POL 'Y 5, 8
(2013).
18 A History of the Drug War, DRUG POL ’Y ALL ., https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war (last visited
May 5, 2022).
19 Id.
20 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; 21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.
21 A History of the Drug War, supra note 18.
22 Id.
14
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persisted through the 2000s and has consequences that bleed into the present day.23 Only recently
has decriminalization of certain drugs—like cannabis—gained strong traction in Congress after
many states have taken the initiative to decriminalize on the state level.24
Rampant opioid distribution by prescribing physicians for pain management is thought to
be one cause of the enveloping “Opioid Crisis” that developed in the past few decades.25
Pharmaceutical companies in the 1990s assured that patients would not become addicted to
opioid pain relievers.26 This cascaded into the opioid epidemic, as pharmacological intervention
for pain became prevalent throughout the United States.27 In fact, American physicians are three
times more likely to prescribe an opioid to their patients compared with European doctors. 28 The
subsequent increase in prescriptions ordered by healthcare practitioners resulted in an increase in
opioid misuse due to developing addictions among patients. 29 Unfortunately, opioid abuse can
be serious enough to result in deaths. The CDC cites three major waves in the rise of opioid
overdose deaths: first, a rise in prescription opioid overdose deaths in 1999; second, a rise in
heroin overdose deaths in 2010; and third, a rise in synthetic opioid deaths in 2013. 30 Despite the
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Id.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, House Votes to Decriminalize Cannabis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/01/us/politics/marijuana-legalization.html
25 See Carolina Arteaga & Victoria Barone, A Manufactured Tragedy: The Origins and Deep Ripples of the Opioid
Epidemic, UNIV. OF TORONTO DEP’T OF ECONS. 2 (Mar. 25, 2022),
https://viquibarone.github.io/baronevictoria/Opioids_ArteagaBarone.pdf.
26 Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT ’L I NST . ON DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 11, 2021), https://nida.nih.gov/drugtopics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Victor Absil, Efficient Prosecution of False Claims Act Violation May Help Relieve the Current Opioid
Crisis, 45 AM. J.L. & M ED. 253, 256 (2019).
29 What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T H EALTH AND H UM. SERV. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html.
30 Understanding the Epidemic, C TR. FOR DISEASE C ONTROL (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.
24

6

clear risks and relatively high rate of addiction, opioid use persists as a common method for
acute or chronic pain relief today.31
Data on opioid addiction and misuse give insight to how patients most commonly abuse
the drugs. When the patient takes a higher dosage than prescribed, it is considered misuse.32 The
most common reason for patient misuse of prescription pain relievers is actually to treat physical
pain and ailments.33 The second and third highest reasons for misuse, respectively, are to “get
high” and to relieve tension.34 The high availability of opioid prescriptions to patients makes this
trend not all too surprising. With the existence of alternative, non-opioid based pain relievers,
this issue seems to be unnecessarily promulgated through high supply and expected demand .35
The federal government has implemented measures to reduce misuse of Federally
Controlled Substances (“FCSs”) through various statues. The CSA controls FCSs to prevent drug
abuse and, specifically for the context of this paper, opioid abuse.36 The FDCA, FCA, and state
systems all further place responsibility and liability on distributors and manufacturers for their
conduct in handling prescription practices and labelling of FCSs, respectively.37 With the
government’s role as a healthcare provider under Medicare and Medicaid, the government has an
interest in limiting the number of unnecessary prescriptions that it pays for, especially when
negative effects of opioid abuse have become so apparent and it has become a systemic issue.38

31

Opioids for Acute Pain: What You Need to Know, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL ,
https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/patients/pdf/Acute-Pain-What-You-Need-to-Know.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
32 Id.
33 Rachel N. Lipardi et al, Why Do adults misuse prescription drugs?, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND M ENTAL H EALTH
SERVS. ADMIN. (2015), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_3210/ShortReport -3210.html.
34 Id.
35 FDA Takes Steps Aimed at Fostering Development of Non -Addictive Alternatives to Opioids for Acute Pain
Management, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-takes-steps-aimed-fostering-development-non-addictive-alternatives-opioids-acute-painmanagement.
36 The Controlled Substances Act, supra note 14.
37 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Hafajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, NEW
ENGLAND J. M ED. 2301-05 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1710756.
38 Absil, supra note 28.
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In light of this, the government also has an interest in not allowing privatized healthcare avenues
to be abused either. The CSA effectively protects both government- and privately funded opioid
misuse, and other statutes aid in punishing opioid abuse.
A. The CSA
The CSA regulates drugs that have a strong history for addiction or abuse.39 With this,
Congress has twin aims of allowing the use of drugs for a legitimate medical purpose while also
preventing the unnecessary use of drugs that can have a detrimental effect on the health and
welfare of the American people.40 The CSA provides in relevant part that:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a counterfeit substance.41
One exception to this rule includes drugs that are “issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice,” but this exception
does not give a physician universal freedom to prescribe as she pleases.42 The physician must
still act in accordance with a DEA registration by taking actions that both meet the standards laid
out in their registration and act within the reasonable principles of medicine.
Congress recognized the two competing public policy issues that a drug might have
legitimate medical purpose, but illegal and improper use of that same drug can have serious
detrimental effects on a user or patient.43 Not all drugs are controlled under this act; only those

39

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812.
The Controlled Substances Act, supra note 14.
41 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
42 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
43 21 U.S.C. § 801(2).
40
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drugs with the particularized identification for control are subject to this act and receive a federal
“scheduling” and are considered FCSs.44 All opioids are FCSs, and higher-Schedule opioids are
those more likely to be abused.45
Federally scheduled drugs are inherently subject to the CSA. Not all drugs fall under the
scope of the CSA; the CSA primarily seeks to control prescription drugs because over-thecounter drugs are less likely to be abused.46 Federal drug regulation and control depends on a
“schedule” basis which categorize drugs based on certain criteria. There are established five
schedules of controlled substances, to be known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. 47 Schedule I
drugs are drugs that have no recognized medical purpose, and Schedule II drugs are those with
medical purposes but a high risk of abuse, which includes most opioids. 48 The schedules are
categories by which the drugs are organized for severity of offense.49 Authority is given to the
Attorney General as to commission the federal scheduling of drugs under this Act. 50 The
Administrator of the DEA and Congress have authority to schedule substances.51 The schedule of
a particular drug can change over time; a drug might get its schedule changed based on new
information.
The CSA also regulates the degree to which a practitioner can prescribe drugs. A
practitioner is defined as:
a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or
other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, to distribute, dispense,
44

Id. § 802(6).
Leah Miller, Opioid Drug Classifications & Drug Schedules, AM. ADDICTION CTRS. (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://americanaddictioncenters.org/opiates/controlled-substances.
46 21 U.S.C. § 829. But see James E. Lessenger and Steven D. Feinberg, Abuse of Prescription and Over-theCounter Medications, 21 CLINICAL REV. 45 (Aug. 7, 2007), https://www.jabfm.org/content/jabfp/21/1/45.full.pdf.
47 21 USC § 812(b).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See 21 USC § 811.
51 Id.
45
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conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical
analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research. 52
(emphasis added)
The CSA is intended to be limited in scope and not “occupy the field” on subject matters that
belong to the respective states outside of federal regulations.53 Courts have held that a violation
of federal law is separate from a violation of state law, and the state law legalizing a particular
drug does not render the federal law is invalid, but rather that federal and state laws are
separate.54 State laws generally do mirror the federal provisions; however, states do have the
power to deviate from federal drug scheduling as to state enforcement matters.55 Where a federal
law and state law are directly in contention, the federal law does not overrule the state law
entirely; instead, federal enforcement actions can still be taken within the state, but alleged
violators will not be prosecuted under state law. 56 For example, cannabis is now legal to
purchase in the state of New Jersey.57 Although New Jersey residents still run a risk of breaking
federal law in purchasing cannabis, administrations of recent Presidents have pushed an initiative
to not prosecute on the federal level.58 The DEA has authority over administrative actions to hold
physicians, manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies accountable for violations of the various

52

21 USC § 802(21).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
54 See United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2010); White Mountain Health Center, Inc. v.
County of Maricopa, No. 2012-053585, 2012 WL 6656902, at *7-8 (Ariz. Super. Dec. 3, 2012).
55 See NAT ’L C ONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE M EDICAL M ARIJUANA LAWS (Nov. 4, 2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
56 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
57 See Hannah Sarisohn, New Jersey to begin recreational cannabis sales April 21 , CNN B US. (Apr. 14, 2022),
https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/14/business/new-jersey-cannabis-sales/index.html
58 See, e.g., Whitt Steinker, President-Elect Joe Biden and the Future of Cannabis Policy in America , B RADLEY
(Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2020/12/president -elect-joe-biden-and-the-futureof-cannabis-policy-in-america.
53
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CSA regulatory requirements.59 Registrants who fail to comply with the standards of the CSA
may be punished with criminal or civil fines, the possibility of imprisonment, or both. 60
The CSA creates two provisions: the registration provision, and trafficking provision.
The registration provision requires individuals and entities working with controlled substances to
file a registration with the federal government and to take active measures to avoid the abuse and
misuse of controlled substances generally.61 Under this provision, all persons who produce,
distribute, or dispense a controlled substance must register with the DEA unless an exemption
applies.62 Practitioners who dispense controlled substances may obtain registrations that last
from one to three years.63 The registrations provide insight to the degree that a registrant can
possess, distribute, or dispense controlled substances, and registered entities and individuals must
abide by the limitations of their registration. 64 Registrations expire at the end of the registration
period unless they are specifically renewed by the party.65 One of the registrant’s primary duties
to avoid violation of the CSA is to keep accurate records of the controlled substances they
receive, sell, dispose, or deliver.66 When a physician prescribes a medication, it is considered
distribution for the purposes of the CSA because of its “substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people.” 67 With a violation or potential violation of
the registration requirements, the DEA has discretion to take enforcement action against adverse

21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(6); Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Regulatory and Enforcement Efforts to
Control the Diversion of Opioids, OFF. I NSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 2019), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/e1905.pdf.
60 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(6).
61 21 U.S.C. § 822; 21 C.F.R. Part 1301.
62 Id.
63 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(1).
64 21 C.F.R. § 1301.13(a).
65 21 C.F.R. § 1301.13(c).
66 21 U.S.C. § 827; 21 C.F.R. Part 1304.
67 21 U.S.C. § 801(1).
59
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parties, including sending warning letters, retracting registration of that entity, or imposing
monetary penalties.68
Under the trafficking provision, the Department of Justice is empowered with enforcing
the CSA by charging against those alleged traffickers of FCSs. The landmark case surrounding
prosecution of physicians was decided half a century ago in United States v. Moore, where the
Supreme Court of the United States held that physicians may be prosecuted under the CSA when
their practices fall outside of the “usual course of practice.”69 Many cases have come before
courts of the United States to determine conduct that fall outside the course of professional
practice.70 In these cases, “drug pusher” physicians are usually the ones prosecuted, especially
when the trafficking is so blatant that the quantity or prescription implies that the physician acted
without a medical purpose.71 However, the line for prosecution is less clear where the physician
is not categorically a drug pusher and where he acted in good faith. The good -faith standard is
one of the prominent issues on appeal for the Ruan case.72
The petitioner in Ruan is a physician. Petitioner asserts in his brief to the Supreme Court
that the CSA shows that physicians are entitled to assert the defense of a good faith medical
purpose for a prescription.73 Petitioner first argues that the CSA’s text, structure, and history
demonstrate that physicians are allowed to assert a good -faith defense that the prescriptions were
for a legitimate medical purpose.74 Petitioner then argues that a subjective good faith standard is
a necessary element to the adequate practice and progress of medicine.75 An objective good faith

68

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 822(f), 824(a), 842(c), 842(d).
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 133 (1975).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Ruan v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ruan-v-united-states (last
visited May 4, 2022).
73 Brief for Petitioner at 4.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 40-47.
69
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standard is opposed by the physicians unless it allows “breathing room” that allows for
physicians to “depart from professional norms” if it is within the scope of the physician’s
education and evaluations.76
As the Respondent, the United States (“Respondent”) opposes petitioner’s contentions
and argues that dispensing drugs without any “objectively reasonable effort to actually practice
medicine” is a violation of the CSA.77 Respondent argues for an objective standard but states that
a physician’s subjective views, when deviate from conventional medicine, may still result in a
conviction under Section 841(a).78 The CSA prohibits a physician from self-defining the scope of
his medical practice.79 The Supreme Court has recognized that a physician can violate Section
841(a) when he fails to make an “honest effort” to rely in “good faith” on his DEA registration. 80
Additionally, Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate
their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's. 81
These two competing sides demonstrate a case study of a larger set of competing interests
of the government’s role in regulating drugs and protecting consumers and physicians’ role in
being able to evaluate patients and prescribe pharmaceutical remedies if appropriate. The issue in
Ruan is protective of the prosecutorial process rather than allowing drug-pushers to continue
their work. One argument by the petitioner’s counsel during oral argument is that not allowing
for the good-faith defense will impede medical research and that state medical boards should be

76

Id. at 47.
Brief for Respondent, Ruan v. United States, (No. 20-1410), 2022 WL 190848 at 19.
78 Id. at 24.
79 Id. at 24-26.
80 Id.at 26-31.
81 Id. at 31-33.
77
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the body to audit medical competence.82 However, the prosecutorial system under the CSA is an
aid to state boards, not contrary to it or exemptive of it.
B. FDA/FDCA
All FCSs subject to the CSA are also inherently subject to the FDCA. The FDCA was
enacted to ensure that drugs are safe and effective for their enumerated uses and that labelling,
and packaging accurately and truthfully reflects the purpose and information necessary for
consumers to be informed.83 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is primarily tasked
with enforcing the FDCA and regulations that it establishes to protect consumers’ body, health,
and money.84 The FDCA’s primary goal is to protect consumers and not to punish a physician’s
misconduct, although these often go hand-in-hand.85 Thus, the FDCA does not regulate the
practice of medicine but rather the labeling and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs. 86 Physicians,
therefore, are not generally prosecuted under the FDCA because the FDCA is primarily
concerned with punishing manufacturers who mislabel or misbrand drugs, which can have
significant negative consequences upon the consumer. 87 Violations of the FDCA can have severe
consequences, as the scienter requirement under other statutes is not required in the criminal case
against a physician under the FDCA.88 Penalties can include fines, sanctions, or complete
prevention from future prescribing authority. 89 The FDCA does not play a significant role in this

D. Jacques Smith et. al, Lawsuit Over Doctor’s Intent in Opioid “Pill Mill” Prescription Case Reaches SCOTUS,
NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 8, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/prosecutors-target-fake-covid-19immunization-and-vaccination-cards.
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 331.
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 371.
85 What We Do, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do
86 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.
87 21 U.S.C. § 331.
88 Id.
89 21 U.S.C. § 333.
82
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paper’s analysis, but it is important to note as another federal statute that pertains specifically to
opioids.
C. The FCA
The FCA is another statute which imposes penalties upon individuals. When an
individual:
(A) knowingly presents or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim …
[he] is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty…90
The falsity may either be factually or legally false for the purposes of the FCA. 91 Within the
context of opioid abuse and over prescription, factual falsities are perhaps more prevalent toward
the systemic problem of patient abuse.92 However, legal falsities also exist within the context that
doctors may not treat the patient in accordance with federally mandated guidelines. 93
The government has two essential aims under an FCA action for opioid over prescription.
First, the FCA will deal with the defrauding of governmental programs specifically. 94 Thus,
government money is involved. Second, the FCA is invoked specifically where, if the
government knew about the falsity, it would not have paid for that opioid prescription. Opioid
abuse under the FCA is certainly not something that the government wants to enable through its
programs. Therefore, the FCA is a strong supplement to a CSA claim because it further ensures
that fraud and abuse do not occur through government programs without monetary penalties.
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A limit of the FCA in the context of opioid fraud and abuse is that the FCA is only
relevant where government programs are involved. The false claims of the FCA are specifically
false claims toward the federal government, not just frivolously written prescriptions for any
patient. Where government programs are involved, the FCA may have significantly more
freedom to punish physicians.95 The mens rea requirement and burden of proof are not nearly as
stringent as in the CSA; the FCA operates under a “knowingly” requirement.96 This mens rea
requirement might also be combatted through a “good faith” defense, as a physician operating in
good faith may not meet the minimum requirement for “knowing” the claim was false.
Billing to the United States government on government-assisted patients’ healthcare can
be problematic if the physicians do not follow the proper steps laid out by different regulatory
agencies. If the doctor is not diligent in his evaluation of the patient, this could present problems
of both abuse and improper prescription to the patients. As discussed in the state boards section
below, doctors have both regulations by state boards on qualifications for prescribing on the state
level (where they are licensed) and the need to assess potential risks for abuse among her
patients.

II. State Level Control of Opioids
States are allowed to set their own regulations and regulating bodies regarding physicians
and FCSs. State decriminalization of substances such as marijuana have become quite rampant
throughout the nation on the state level despite the federal prohibition of those substances.97 For
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example, one will no longer be prosecuted in New Jersey state court for possession of marijuana,
but they still may be prosecuted in the District Court for New Jersey. Because prosecutors have
ultimate discretion over these cases on the federal level and will generally prosecute serious
offenses, this is an unlikely scenario; however, it is an illustrative example of the symbiosis—
and the challenges—between state and federal regulatory policies.
State boards of medical examiners have significant discretion in regulating non-criminal
aspects of opioid prescription as well. In New Jersey, the Board of Medical Examiners
(“NJBME”) has been authorized to regulate the practice of medicine since 1894, including
setting forth the licensing requirements for physicians, nurses, etc. 98 In 2005, the NJBME was
tasked with regulating criteria for Continuing Medical Education along with the Commission on
Higher Education.99 The NJBME has several committees, including the Screening, Preliminary
Evaluation, Executive, Credentials, and Impairment Review Committees, which each address
specific issues relating to licensures, complaints, investigations, and drug or alcohol dependency
among New Jersey physicians.100 Disciplinary action, such as license revocation, can occur after
NJBME investigations if the punishment is fitting.101 These boards provide a fundamental
backbone for state regulations.
A. States’ Board Regulations and Their Role in Preventing Prescription Abuse
While the CSA governs the federal control of enumerated substances, state boards have a
lot of latitude to regulate what physicians can prescribe and the circumstances for prescriptions.
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State boards are delegated this under the CSA, as the CSA sought to avoid preemption as a
constitutional matter. Nevertheless, state board regulations are often similar from state-to-state,
and state boards seek compliance respective to the CSA. 102
The New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners has latitude in regulating and
licensing physicians throughout the state and seeks to protect citizens of New Jersey as potential
patients subject to medical professionals within the state. 103 A change in 2017 saw greater
restrictions on how opioids and other Schedule II controlled substances can be prescribed
through physicians.104 New Jersey calls these substances “controlled dangerous substances”
(“CDSs”). 105 In New Jersey:
Providers must [t]ake a thorough history, including any history of substance use
disorder;
Either: Conduct a physical exam in-person; or [d]uring the current COVID-19
public health emergency (PHE), conduct an exam by telemedicine. For
prescribing at a first visit, this telemedicine exam must be conducted using real
time, interactive, audio-visual methods.
For subsequent visits, a phone encounter is permitted. 106
These goals likely exist to ensure the standard of care for patients and establish the physician’s
credibility for prescribing the patient a drug. Physicians are also required to discuss risks,
benefits, and alternatives to opioid prescriptions treatments, as well as limiting doses to “no more
than a 5-day supply at the lowest effective dose.”107 Prescription refills cannot prescribed until at
least 4 days after the date of the initial prescription, and physicians are supposed to evaluate
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whether the patient may have the risk for drug abuse, addiction, or diversion after the initial
prescription.108
The New Jersey Prescription Monitoring Program (“NJPMP”) is a well-established
resource—developed by state boards—which prescribers are required to use to audit the patient’s
prescription history and assess for signs of risk for abuse. 109 Physicians are required to use the
database:
The first time they prescribe any Schedule II medication or opioid for acute or
chronic pain, or a Schedule III or IV benzodiazepine;
Every 3 months thereafter, if continuing to prescribe one of the above; and
Any time the patient appears to be seeking CDS for any purpose other than
the treatment of an existing medical condition (e.g., misuse, abuse, or diversion).110
Physicians are required to report prescriptions to the database no more than one business day
after the date of prescription dispense.111 Patients are ensured privacy through this database in
accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). 112 State
boards ultimately provide a state system of auditing and regulating physician competence and
drug control.
B. New Jersey’s Controlled Substance Laws and Enforcement
On the legislative level, most states have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(“UCSA”) model statute, which makes for little difference in state-to-state substance control
laws.113 However, states have the freedom to both modify the UCSA for their own purposes and
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to add substances that are not FCSs under the CSA. 114 States may also elect to not to control
substances that are FCSs under the CSA, but federal enforcement actions nevertheless remain
enforceable by federal agents within that state. 115 So, while the federal government does not
preempt state law for controlled substances, decriminalized state-level offenses do not eliminate
possible federal convictions.116
New Jersey’s controlled substances laws have considerations very similar to that of the
federal government:
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse;
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known;
(3) State of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse;
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health;
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under this article.117
The New Jersey Attorney General is also charged with leading enforcement measures, including:
identify, investigate, and prosecute the illegal sources and distribution of
prescription opioid drugs; take appropriate steps to enhance the oversight by
professional licensing boards relating to the administration and dispensing of
controlled dangerous substances by regulated professionals; and provide training for
law enforcement officials and recommend training for physicians, pharmacists, and
other health care professionals in state-of-the-art methods to detect prescription drug
diversion and related abuses.118
In 2020, the NJBME and Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal permanently revoked a
physician’s license after she traveled to Rhode Island weekly to prescribe CDSs such as
fentanyl, oxycodone, and other opioids without following proper guidance laid out by the
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NJBME.119 While the prosecutors do have discretion over the cases they pursue, their
cooperation with the NJBME is not uncommon and often leads to sanctions such as the
license revocation seen here. Through this prosecutorial action, state action is legitimized,
and states like New Jersey can effectively enforce its own set of laws at the state level
rather than relying solely on federal prosecution. In addition, state level prosecution
provides the benefit of working with its state boards to ensure the punishments are fair and
reflect the boards’ missions.

III. Enforcement Action Under the CSA: Applying Ruan
The number of criminal cases arising against physicians have increased dramatically in
the past three decades.120 This pattern is correlative with the timeline of the opioid epidemic in
the United States.121 Most of these physicians who faced prosecution practiced in private
practice.122
Fraud can often be obvious when a physician acts very blatantly without a medical
purpose. In a CNN article, Prosecutor Benczkowski was quoted:
When you go and observe this doctor’s office and you see lines down the block,
you see people shuffling around waiting to go into the doctor’s office, you see
behavior that looks very much like behavior you see in traditional street corner
hand-to-hand drug distribution, it’s stark. It’s readily apparent what’s going on. 123
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Physicians must provide a patient with detailed information about an offered treatment, the
potential alternatives, and the potential benefits of alternatives. 124 The final decision ultimately
rests with the patient about the use of a treatment, but doctors are not required to disclose all
potential risks.125 Instead, doctors are merely required to give adequate information to the patient
in order for the patient to make the final decision. 126 While the CSA is not concerned with
medical-malpractice-type issues, a physician who gives her patient more information is more
likely to be serving a legitimate medical purpose than a physician who omits these conversations.
Prescriptions for a drug requires careful medical judgment. Generally, the more information that
a physician provides patients about alternative treatment options and the risk analysis, patients
are less likely to assert that a physician failed to provide adequate information and notice of risks
associated with a drug.127
A. Legitimate Medical Purpose
Part of the regulation of physicians includes the standard that physicians must have a
good faith effort to prescribe medication for a legitimate medical purpose.128 A legitimate
medical purpose is ill defined, as it would be inappropriate for the DEA to define it.129 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit has held that state governments should retain authority to define a legitimate
medical purpose.130 A legitimate medical purpose is generally expected to conform to the
commonly held practices within medicine and seeks to limit fraud or abuse. 131
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State and federal laws that limit the freedoms a physician can have when prescribing
medication invariably demonstrate Congress’s and states’ desires to protect patients. Patients
require protection because some physicians, for one reason or another, participate in shady
practices. Medicine is constantly evolving, as the search for novel or bettered treatment options
continues in nearly all sectors of healthcare. 132 By limiting physicians to the scope of practice
that is already well established, regulations do not allow doctors to lean into new medical
practices or drugs that may be directly beneficial to a patient.
A genuine public policy concern is that these practices are not based on well-regarded
medical evidence.133 However, new drugs are constantly being developed, and novel diseases are
being discovered. Medical science and practice, therefore, is also constantly developing and
evolving. Because a legitimate medical purpose is based upon a physician’s analysis, the good
faith standard has its own set of limitations which also do not paint the clear line to consistently
separate the legitimate practice of medicine and experimental or fraudulent uses of prescriptions
for various purposes. Furthermore, the drug scheduling circumstances do not always correlate
with up-to-date medical standards. Schedule I drugs are specifically drugs that have no
recognized medical benefit, but cannabis is included in Schedule I and has both been dispensed
for medicinal purposes and is being legalized in many states. 134 So, the “legitimate medical
purpose” standard is not fully rooted in science.
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This standard is meant to encompass a broad range of accepted medical practices. By
following accepted medical practices, physicians generally avoid risk of fraud and abuse. 135
Consequently, when physicians deviate from the set standards for physicians, they tread into
murky water that may be construed as fraud or abuse for prescriptions.136 Physicians may
demonstrate a legitimate medical purpose through the “good faith” defense; however, the “good
faith” defense standard may not always account for off-label use or deviation in recommended
prescription amounts that the doctor subjectively believes is a legitimate application of
medicine.137 This, in turn, blurs the line between a prescription’s practical use and use within the
context of a legitimate medical purpose. Thus, the question becomes of who defines a legitimate
medical purpose. However, due to the personal and, in many cases, subjective views in the
practice of medicine, good faith does play an important role, whether subjective or objective.
B. “Good Faith” Defense Standard
One of the most contentious points in the Ruan case is the “good faith” defense standard.
Under this standard, a physician may not be convicted under the CSA if she believes in good
faith that her prescription standards fulfill a legitimate medical purpose. 138 This standard might
be an objective one, but it inherently has subjective elements because the practice of medicine is
not exact and drugs often serve one or more legitimate medical purposes. This standard is
integral in ensuring that the CSA does not occupy the field of medicine and merely punishes
misconduct where physicians prescribe for a non-medical purpose or in bad faith.
The balance between the subjective nature of the medical practice and the objective needs
for a standard of this magnitude is contested in Ruan, and a few Justices have concerns of
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physicians on the “wrong side” of practice, which may materially affect the Supreme Court’s
holding.139 The Petitioner argues that the standard is more properly a subjective one because
requiring a physician’s conduct to be “reasonable” would result in mere negligence liability,
thereby blurring the line between general malpractice and a federal violation under the CSA.
However, a subjective standard likely allows for an appreciable margin of error that a trier of fact
for the objective standard may find reasonable. A subjective standard, though, blurs the line
where the physician’s good-faith view of the medical practice needs to correspond with that of
other physicians.
The relative objectivity or subjectivity of this standard still does not account for a wide
range of scenarios that should or should not be prosecuted. A doctor who keeps up with the latest
scientific research may find novel solutions that are atypical to the current medical practice yet
seem “unreasonable” on the surface. On the contrary, a doctor could take “reasonable” measures
and still enable clear abuse for their patients. The circuits are not all harmonious on this issue but
resolving the circuit split will not remedy all the scenarios where the particular practice in
medicine does or does not seem “reasonable” to a jury. 140 While a defense standard need not be
perfect, the contentiousness further exploits competing public policy interests and how they
remain in contention regardless of the outcome of Ruan.
In a proceeding, expert witnesses can testify to whether they do or do not believe that a
particular set of medical practices have merit for a good faith medical purpose.141 However, this
would not be materially changed whether the standard is subjective or objective. The only thing
that would change is the question to the jury. Under the objective standard, the jury must decide
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whether the doctor acted in accordance with commonly held medical practices in good faith. 142
Under the subjective standard, the jury must decide whether the doctor himself believed that his
practices were in furtherance of a legitimate medical purpose. 143 Neither of these standards are
perfect.
If the Court is to side with an objective view, it fits physicians into a narrow box for the
standards they need to follow. However, this standard is not necessarily bad, as it might protect
patients from exploitation that the subjective standard could have. If the Court adopts the
subjective standard, it will give liberties to good doctors for trying new or different ways of
helping patients cope with pain or illness. But this could come at a cost. Under either scenario,
the Supreme Court will not give a holding that fixes the larger dilemma here. More than likely,
the Court will merely come to a conclusion that picks the better of the two for public policy
purposes and the one that favors the ease of judicial proceedings, which is probably the objective
standard. The dilemma exists as an almost fortunate byproduct of information being shared so
easily and technological advances that has medicine constantly being reevaluated. However,
physicians are generally not in the labs or universities pursuing these changes. Allowing
subjectivity in a physician-patient relationship will give the potential for many larger issues to
come from this. While this Supreme Court case may not resolve a major public policy dilemma
here, Ruan is important for the integrity of judicial process in deciding what standard a
prosecutor must meet under the burden of proof.
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IV. Public Policy Conclusions
The considered public policy interests will likely remain unresolved even after the Ruan
decision is handed down from the Supreme Court. With the rise in number and prevalence of
opioids—both medical and nonmedical—in American society and a healthcare system that has a
reliance on them, it is hard to separate the medical value of allowing physicians to prescribe
opioids in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose. However, it is also not reasonable to have
very few or loosely enforced sanctions for physicians who abuse this privilege through over
prescription, prescriptions in not in good faith, or prescriptions for a nonmedical purpose. Likely,
drugs with addictive properties will always have an inherent risk, and it is important to recognize
which drugs have a need and efficacy that outweighs their risk, and which drugs have more risk
than benefit that they can provide.
A physician who looks like a “drug pusher” and prescribes iotas of opioids to its patients
should probably be prosecuted. On the other side, patients who are in severe pain and could
benefit from pain killers should be able to meet with their physician and receive a proper
prescription if that doctor both examines the patient and sees that it is the most beneficial option.
Those are easy cases. The tough cases come where physician provides both legitimate and shady
practices. The question of “to prosecute or not to prosecute” may come at the likelihood that the
prosecutorial authority will have near-guaranteed success; prosecutors are going to go for the
“big fish,” not someone whose conduct was just on the cusp. However, reducing the number of
opioids that wind up on the street or improperly stored or disposed of might be a net-positive
option to prevent patients—the consumers—from falling victim to this epidemic rather than
punishing the physicians themselves.
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One of the primary ways that will theoretically reduce opioid abuse that stems from both
doctors’ prescriptions and patients’ use is by limiting the number of prescriptions. By stopping
the issue at the root, one might think that this would directly stymie the issue. What this might
look like is that doctors could have a capped number of prescriptions that they can give per year.
Unfortunately, this theory would place a further cap on the doctors’ ability to prescribe medicine,
even for legitimate medical purposes. Even the most sustainable models are likely inadequate
because of the regulations that it will place on doctors. For example, limiting the number of
prescriptions a doctor can make in a year as a flat number will not reflect that some doctors have
inherently less patients than others, and therefore the “smaller” doctors will have more
opportunity for abuse than “bigger” doctors. As another example, if doctors are limited by ratio
of patients to numbers of prescriptions, fraud and abuse may still exist as a product of just having
more patients nominally. Under this scenario, a doctor could “dilute” the fraud and abuse just by
gaining more patients. Under a third scenario, if doctors are limited in the number of
prescriptions that may be prescribed per patient, fraud will still occur because it will not always
stem from a legitimate medical purpose. Here, the old adage remains that a few bad apples ruin
the good of the many. Therefore, limitations on doctors’ prescribing practice exhibits a slippery
slope that may not be effective in achieving the legitimate means which public policy is
concerned with.
So, what is next? Ruan is merely an exposé of the larger issue that historically abused
drugs infiltrate our medical system because of their ease of access and prescription. Physicians
may be to blame, but we need more of an overhaul to ideas of pain management and prescribing
practices on the state and federal level before anything will see beneficial change. This current
system that encourages use of these drugs, even in milder cases of pain, is exactly the problem
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which causes rampant opioid abuse. Surely, we need to prosecute and reprimand physicians who
operate practices under questionable standards, but we also need to attack this at its core and not
merely place a band aid on the issue. Alternatives to opioids for a similar pain-management
purpose may be necessary if we do not want this already grand issue to continue to plague a
significant group in our society.
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